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Abstract 
This paper investigates the determinants of international R&D outsourcing, in particular 
the role of trade. We construct a monopolistic competition model with heterogeneous 
firms where outsourcing increases a firm’s fixed transaction as well as its productivity. 
Financial constraints affect the decision to outsource R&D more to non-exporters than to 
exporters. In contrast, exporters are more sensitive to a lack of information because they 
have higher losses when there is technology leakage. We test these predictions using a 
panel database of Spanish companies. The results highlight the relevance of information 
in competitive markets, and the role of trade to induce companies to engage in other 
globalization strategies. 
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1. Introduction 
In highly competitive industries, innovation is essential for the survival of the 
firms. Companies have incentives to buy technological services from commercial 
providers, customers, universities or even competitors located around the world (Baumol, 
2001). For example, in the pharmaceutical industry, a large part of the clinical tests are 
done by external companies in Israel, Taiwan or South Korea; Boeing subcontracts the 
design of some components from companies located all around the world; manufacturers 
of semiconductors work closely with suppliers from other countries to jointly develop 
new products (The Economist Intelligent Unit, 2007).  
Despite the growing importance of international R&D outsourcing, little is known 
about its determinants. In this paper, we study the determinants to international R&D 
outsourcing, in particular we analyse how trade can affect the decision to outsource R&D 
internationally. We develop a theoretical model and provide empirical evidence. 
Some previous studies have empirically analysed the complementarities between 
international R&D outsourcing and internal R&D (e.g., Arvanitis and Hollenstein, 2006, 
Braga and Willmore, 1991, and Veugelers and Cassiman, 1999). An important message 
from this literature is that international R&D outsourcing does not seem to substitute 
domestic R&D, since firms need absorptive capacities to outsource R&D. These papers, 
however, do not look at the role of trade, which is our main research question. 
Specifically, we analyse to what extent trade favours international R&D outsourcing, and 
whether some of the determinants to outsource R&D abroad differ between exporters and 
non-exporters. We focus on the factors that firms report as the most important ones for 
their decision to outsource R&D: intellectual property loss, and financial constraints 
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(Lewin and Couto, 2006, The Economist Intelligent Unit, 2007, R&D magazine, 2007). 
We have three main sets of theoretical and empirical findings. First, we find that 
international R&D outsourcing is more likely for exporters than for non-exporters. 
Second, we show that financial constraints affect only non-exporters. Third, we find that 
exporters are more sensitive than non-exporters to a lack of information that helps to 
monitor technological leakage. 
In order to explain the link between trade and international R&D outsourcing, we 
propose a model of monopolistic competition with heterogeneous firms. In the model, 
companies can outsource internationally, domestically, or not at all. Outsourcing 
increases the firms’ productivity and fixed transaction costs. We assume that there is a 
cash-in-advance constraint at the beginning of the period, which deters the possibility to 
outsource unless a bank finances the transaction costs. Under borrowing constraints, the 
bank extends finance to a firm if the company can offer its operating profits to the 
creditor. The model predicts that exporters tend to outsource more abroad than non-
exporters because as exporters are selling to a larger market, technological international 
outsourcing is relatively less costly for exporters. By trading, a firm decreases its 
financial constraints, which allows the purchase of technology abroad. However, a 
company becomes reluctant to outsource R&D internationally when there is technology 
leakage. We formalize this concept by assuming that a firm experiences a reduction in its 
demand when there are hold-up problems. This leads to exporters facing larger potential 
losses than non-exporters under technology leakage. The model predicts that an exporter 
becomes more dependent on information than a non-exporter if technology leakage can 
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be partly monitored with information about the technology or about the market 
characteristics.  
We provide empirical evidence by using data on approximately 7,000 Spanish 
companies for the years 2004 and 2005. We find that being an exporter increases the 
probability of outsourcing R&D abroad by more than one half. We show that financial 
constraints are obstacles to outsourcing internationally for non-exporters, but that this is 
not the case for exporters. By contrast, only exporters find that the lack of information on 
markets or on technology is an obstacle to outsourcing abroad.   
This paper is related to recent contributions by Antràs and Helpman (2004) and 
Helpman et al. (2004). Our paper is also part of the literature of financial market frictions 
and firms’ decisions (Cooley and Quadrini, 2001). For example, Manova (2006) shows 
that credit constraints determine trade patterns. In Chaney (2005) and Manova (2006) 
heterogeneous companies face credit constraints to finance their costs of trade. But unlike 
these papers, we study how financial constraints can affect the decision to outsource 
R&D.  
This paper is also related to the growing literature on international outsourcing 
(e.g., Glass, 2004, Stähler, 2007, Truett and Truett, 2008), but we analyse outsourcing of 
technological services instead of manufactured goods. Our contribution is that we analyse 
a specific channel of international knowledge transfers - the acquisition of technological 
services among firms. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we present the theoretical 
model. Section 3 presents the data, the empirical methodology, and the empirical results 
of the estimations. Section 4 concludes. 
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2. The model  
Our model builds on the Antràs and Helpman (2004) and Helpman et al. (2004) 
models of monopolistic competition with heterogenous firms. We analyse an industry 
with a measure M of active firms. We assume that the economy has two sectors: one is 
characterized by a numeraire good, and the other by differentiated products. The 
preferences of a representative consumer are given by the consumption of the numeraire 
good plus a standard index of consumption of the differentiated products. This index 
reflects the consumer’s taste for varieties. In this set up, the aggregate demand for any of 
the varieties of the differentiated product is given by 
1/( 1)
( )

 jj
p
y p E
P
, where E is the 
aggregate expenditure or the market size, jp  is the price of the jth variety and 
/( 1)
0
  M zP p dz  is the weighted aggregate price index.   
 As in Melitz (2003), we assume that firms are heterogeneous. Companies have 
different levels of productivity, denoted by 1  , associated with traditional inputs (labor, 
physical capital, materials…), and internal R&D resources that provide absorptive 
capacities. We consider that a firm’s efficiency is drawn from a Pareto distribution with 
support [1, )   , and shape  . More productive firms have lower marginal costs than 
their less productive counterparts.   
 After knowing their efficiency level, firms can outsource part of their innovative 
activities either to companies in their country or to firms in another country. In both cases, 
their marginal cost decreases. The cost of producing one unit of output is equal to 1 (  ) ic , 
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with 1,  ic  for 0, ,i D F . The constant ic  is a multiplicative increase of productivity due 
to outsourcing domestically if i D , or to outsourcing abroad if i F , respectively. If 
firms do not outsource (in this case 0i ), there is no productivity increase (and thus 
0 1c ). This multiplicative form ensures that more productive firms benefit relatively more 
from outsourcing than less productive companies. Our justification for this specification is 
that firms with higher productivity have higher absorptive capacity than less productive 
firms. The firm’s productivity increases if the firm outsources, which in the model implies 
that 0 1F Dc c c    , with 0  . If 1  , outsourcing abroad is more productive than 
domestic outsourcing. For some industries it is a question of the complexity of technology. 
For example, aerospace companies buy some pieces from very specialized foreign 
providers. In this line, Brusoni et al. (2001), Cesaroni (2004), and Hagedoorn (1993) show 
that technology sources in some fields provided by suppliers from other countries are the 
best option for the firm to keep up to date. The reason is that international outsourcing can 
offer the possibility to buy the best available technology.  
 We model the cost of outsourcing as a transaction fixed cost denoted by if , for 
,i D F  (e.g., Feenstra et al., 2004). If the firm does not outsource, it bears a fixed cost 0f . 
R&D outsourcing requires close collaboration between the research teams. Therefore, 
international outsourcing implies higher communication, coordination, and organizational 
costs than domestic outsourcing. In the model, this assumption implies that 
0 0  F Df f f  (Antràs and Helpman, 2004).  
 The financial structure of the model follows Cooley and Quadrini (2001). Each firm 
faces a cash-in-advance constraint: at the beginning of every period, it requires a bank to 
finance the outsourcing investment and the fixed cost. Both the bank and the borrower are 
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risk-neutral and only one-period debt contracts are signed with the bank. We consider that a 
constant exogenous shock can force companies to exit the market (Melitz, 2003). If the firm 
defaults, the bank liquidates the company, and the firm immediately exits the industry. The 
bank makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the firm, and issues funds at an interest rate r . The 
bank chooses the interest rate such that the expected repayment from the loan is equal to the 
repayment of a riskless loan, as follows:  
0(1 ) (1 )  (1 )     i ir f r f C ,  with 0(1 ) ,ir f C   for 0, ,i D F .  (1) 
 The left-hand side of equation (1) gives the return of the loan at the riskless interest 
rate 0r . The right-hand side of the equation says that with probability  , the firm can repay 
its debts, and with probability 1  , it goes bankrupt. In the case of bankruptcy, the bank 
gets the collateral denoted by C .1 
 A firm’s objective consists of maximizing profits subject to the constraints. This 
leads to the standard pricing rule ( , ) 1 (   )  i ip c c . We call ( , ) ic  the maximum profit 
of a firm of type   that chooses outsourcing of type i  after applying this pricing rule. We 
consider that 1  ; this rules out the case where firms always prefer not to outsource R&D 
abroad. This assumption seems reasonable for the data that we use in our empirical analysis. 
On average, companies with international outsourcing are eight percentage points more 
likely to have process innovations, three percentage points more likely to obtain product 
innovations, and they are more productive (measured as the logarithm of sales over number 
of employees) than firms with domestic outsourcing. The model includes a zero-profit 
condition and a condition that says that the mass of new entrants in every period exactly 
                                                 
1 We follow closely Melitz (2003) by assuming that there is an exogenous probability of bankruptcy 
independent of firm’s productivity. We want to keep the model as simple and as tractable as possible and at 
the same time being able to study the impact of trade on the endogenous productivity thresholds.  
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replaces the mass of incumbents that exit (Meltiz, 2003). Under the previous assumptions, 
there exist two unique efficiency thresholds.2 The first threshold refers to the efficiency such 
that companies are indifferent with respect to either outsourcing domestically or not 
outsourcing, and the second one to outsourcing either domestically or abroad. They are 
denoted by D  and F , respectively, and they are calculated as the efficiency levels for 
which maximum profits of the decisions are equalized. We obtain a partition of firms. If a 
firm’s efficiency is F  , the company prefers to outsource internationally; if 
( , )D F   , the firm outsources in the domestic market; and finally, if   D , the 
company chooses not to outsource.3  
 
2.1 Open economy model 
 We now assume that there are two identical countries that trade the varieties of Y. 
Trade for continuous exporters involves a variable per unit cost of the good that is 
transported.4 This variable cost implies that for one unit of a good to arrive at the final 
destination, 1  units of the good need to be shipped. While a firm’s prices in the 
domestic market are the same as before, i( , ) 1 ( )  ip c c , exporters set prices in the 
foreign market as in the following expression ( , ) ( )   x i ip c c .  
                                                 
2 Details of the proofs, and the database can be found in the working paper version of this article (García-
Vega and Huergo, 2008). We provide an abbreviated discussion here in the interest of space. 
3 Firms with efficiency equal to the thresholds are indifferent between the different types of outsourcing. 
This is consistent with the case in which firms pursue both domestic and international outsourcing. The 
model could be extended by adding a fixed cost for double-sourcing. If this cost is higher for double-
sourcing than for international outsourcing only, the model would predict that only the most productive 
firms can outsource both domestically and internationally.  
4 We also assume that there is a sunk cost to start exporting. In the empirical analysis, we study the decision 
to outsource for continuous exporters. For this reason, we assume that exporters have already paid the sunk 
cost of entry into the foreign market. The sunk trade cost implies that only some firms can export, and that 
there exists a unique efficiency threshold such that firms with efficiency lower than the threshold do not 
export, while firms with efficiency higher than the threshold decide to export (Melitz, 2003). 
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 We analyze whether the probability of outsourcing is higher for exporters than for 
non-exporters. In our framework, this is equivalent to determining whether the efficiency 
threshold to outsource is lower for exporters than for non-exporters. The difference 
between the minimum thresholds to outsource depends on the differences between the 
profits of exporters and non-exporters. Exporters have on average higher revenues than 
non-exporters before outsourcing, consequently fixed transaction costs associated with 
outsourcing become relatively lower in terms of the total revenue. This result leads to the 
following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1: If 1  , the probability of outsourcing R&D abroad is higher for 
exporters than for non-exporters.   
 
2.2 Open economy model with financial constraints 
There is much evidence showing that financial constraints have important 
implications for firm decisions (e.g., Clementi and Hopenhayn, 2006). These constraints 
can influence a firm’s purchase of technology. In this section, we introduce financial 
constraints in the model, distinguishing their effect for exporters and non-exporters.  
We assume that banks only extend finance to the firm if the company can offer its 
operating profits 0 ( , )k ic  to the creditor, i.e. 0(1 ) ( , )i k ir f c   , with k nx  for non-
exporters, and k x  for exporters (e.g. Manova, 2006), for ,i D F . A company obtains 
financial credit if its efficiency level is as large as the threshold ,i k . This threshold is 
calculated by solving for the efficiency level such that operating profits are equal to the 
repayment of the loan plus the interest, for both exporters and non-exporters, 
respectively. In our analysis, we only focus on financial constraints for R&D investments 
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because they are riskier than other type of investments and therefore they can imply high 
financial constraints.5 
Trade increases operating profits. Therefore, the impact of financial constraints on 
the decision to outsource is more important for non-exporters than for exporters. The 
analytical reason is that the increase in the efficiency threshold needed to outsource when 
there are financial constraints (compared with the situation without financial frictions) is 
larger for non-exporters than for exporters: , , , ,( ) ( ) 0      i nx i nx i x i x , and this 
differential increases as financial constraints increase. This result can be expressed as: 
 
Proposition 2: The negative effect of financial constraints on the probability of 
outsourcing R&D abroad is higher for non-exporters than for exporters. 
  
2.3 Open economy model with technology leakage 
 A key characteristic of R&D outsourcing, and, particularly, outsourcing abroad, is 
that it induces some risks in a situation of imperfect contracts, hold-up problems, and 
cultural differences (e.g. Baccara, 2007, Lai et al., 2009, Ornelas and Turner, 2008). 
Companies can be reluctant to outsource because they can be exposed to subcontractors, 
especially in countries with poor intellectual property rights. The next step of our analysis 
is to look at the impact of technology leakage in an open economy framework. In order to 
simplify the model, we assume that there are no financial constraints in the economy.  
                                                 
5 Incorporating a detailed analysis of financial constraints for market entry can provide additional insights 
about the effects of financial liberalization policies. More liquidity can increase the number of companies 
that enter into the market lowering minimum efficiency thresholds. Additionally, it can become easier to 
obtain financial resources to cover the fixed costs of outsourcing. 
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As in Lai et al. (2009), we consider that firms experience a reduction in their 
demand when there is technology leakage. That is, 1/( 1)( , ) ( ) /  j jy p p E P    with 
(0,1)   if there is leakage, and 1   if there is no leakage. The variable   reflects the 
importance of technology leakage. We assume that it depends on the capacity to monitor 
a subcontractor. We consider that companies can monitor better if they have some 
knowledge of the technological characteristics of the innovation or the market. These 
assumptions guarantee that, from the point of view of the company, information reduces 
the potential hold-up problem. In this framework, the pricing rule does not change with 
respect to the base case. Under the previous simplified assumptions, the negative effect of 
leakage on profits is more severe for exporters than for non-exporters since 
( , , ) ( , , ) 0    
   
x i nx ic c . We summarize this result in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 3:  When companies decide to outsource internationally, the lack of 
information is an obstacle that is relatively more important for exporters than for non-
exporters. 
 
 In summary, our model predicts that: (i) When a firm exports, it becomes more 
likely to outsource (Proposition 1). (ii) Trade has two indirect effects on the decision to 
outsource technology abroad. Firstly, trade makes exporters less financially constrained 
than non-exporters. This effect facilitates international R&D outsourcing for exporters. 
The theory predicts that financial constraints decrease the probability of outsourcing 
internationally mostly for non-exporters (Proposition 2). Secondly, the model shows that 
exporters have larger losses than non-exporters in case of technology leakage. When 
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there is a lack of information that helps to monitor subcontractors, exporters are more 
exposed to the potential danger of international outsourcing than non-exporters. As a 
result, the model predicts a negative relationship between a lack of information and 
international R&D outsourcing for exporters, and a weaker relationship for non-exporters 
(Proposition 3). In the next section, we investigate these predictions empirically. 
 
3. The empirical evidence  
3.1. The data and the main variables 
 The data set that we use comes from a survey of innovating Spanish firms (Panel 
de Innovación Tecnológica, PITEC).6 In order to avoid simultaneity problems, some 
variables related to exporting activity are included with a one-period lag. The empirical 
analysis is conducted for the year 2005, for which we have information from 7,205 firms. 
We consider that a firm is outsourcing R&D if the R&D provider is outside of the 
company. In the survey, there are 2,759 firms that outsource R&D, 447 of which are 
located abroad. 
 The main interest of our analysis consists of testing the predictions developed in 
the previous section: to what extent exports increase international R&D outsourcing 
(proposition 1), and whether exporters and non-exporters are influenced differently by 
financial constraints (proposition 2), and by information problems (proposition 3) at the 
moment of international R&D outsourcing. Our data provides detailed information on 
these variables at the firm level. Each firm indicates its purchases of R&D services from 
                                                 
6 The Spanish National Institute of Statistics constructs this database on the basis of the annual Spanish 
responses to the Community Innovation Survey (CIS). The survey is targeted to manufacturing and services 
companies whose main economic activity corresponds to sections C, D, and E of NACE 93, except non-
industrial companies because of the imprecision of methodological marking in the international context by 
other branches of activity. 
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other companies or institutions at foreign locations. This variable is our measure of R&D 
outsourcing. Companies report their exports. We define a dummy variable for being an 
exporter, and a variable for export intensity, constructed as the ratio of exports over total 
employment.  
Companies answer questions about the factors that prevent them to innovate. We 
construct a variable that measures a firm’s financial constraints. The companies are asked 
how important the lack of funds, the lack of finance, and innovation costs are as factors 
that hamper their innovation. For each of the factors, a company can answer that the 
importance of the factor was high, intermediate, or low, or that the factor was not 
relevant. We assign a number that varies from zero (not relevant) to three (high 
importance) for each answer. Then, we calculate the average importance of the cost 
factors. This is our variable lack of finance.  
We construct a variable that quantifies the value of the information for the 
company. In the survey, the companies are asked how important the lack of information 
on technology, and the lack of information on markets are as factors that hamper their 
innovation. Again, for each of the factors, companies can answer that the importance of 
the factor was high, intermediate or low, or that the factor was not relevant. We calculate 
the variable lack of information in the same way as the variable lack of finance. This 
variable is our measure of the capacity of a firm to monitor its subcontractors. We 
consider that information is a relevant asset for the firm because it helps to avoid 
technology leakage.   
 
3.2. Descriptive analysis 
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 During 2005, around half of the continuous innovating firms were actively engaged 
in external R&D expenditures.7 However, only a small percentage of those companies 
(9.4%) bought R&D abroad.  
 Proposition 1 states that the probability of outsourcing R&D abroad is higher for 
exporters than for non-exporters. This is a relationship that is strongly supported by the 
data. Our first empirical observation is depicted in Figure 1. There, we show that there 
are almost twice as many exporters as non-exporters that outsource abroad.  
INSERT FIGURE 1 
 In Table 1, we show some descriptive statistics of the variables of our empirical 
specification. The exporting intensity is higher for companies with international R&D 
outsourcing than for companies with national outsourcing or for firms with only internal 
R&D expenditures. Again, this pattern illustrates that international outsourcing and export 
activity are strongly positively related.  
INSERT TABLE 1 
 Figure 2 displays our second empirical observation. We compare the importance of 
the lack of finance for the firm by exporting status. Among the companies that do not 
outsource internationally, non-exporters are more concerned about their lack of financial 
resources than exporters. However, this obstacle is less relevant for non-exporters than for 
exporters once firms outsource abroad. This pattern is consistent with our Proposition 2. 
This feature suggests that non-exporters have to face fewer financial constraints than 
exporters in order to outsource abroad. 
                                                 
7 We call a firm with positive innovation expenditures both in 2004 and 2005 a “continuous innovator” 
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 We depict our third empirical observation in Figure 3. We compare the 
importance of the lack of information for the firm by its exporting status. For companies 
that do not outsource internationally, we can see that exporters are more influenced by 
the lack of information than non-exporters. Once companies outsource internationally, 
exporters are less concerned about the lack of information than non-exporters. We 
interpret this variation as reflecting that exporters need to accumulate more information 
than non-exporters in order to outsource, which is consistent with Proposition 3.  
INSERT FIGURES 2 AND 3 
 In summary, the descriptive analysis supports the propositions. In the next section, 
we test our predictions econometrically by controlling for potential covariates.  
 
3.3. The empirical specification  
 We now turn to examining the determinants of international R&D outsourcing at 
the firm level. We simultaneously estimate two equations by maximum likelihood. The 
first one describes a firm’s decision to contract technological activities abroad (selection 
equation). The second equation refers to the intensity of the R&D expenditure abroad. 
The selection equation is given by: 
1 if 0
0 if 0.
F
F
w
rd
w
   
   
        
   (2) 
 The intensity equation, conditional on the firm reporting international R&D 
outsourcing, is expressed as in the following specification: 
* if 1
0 if 0.
r z e rd
r
rd
     
             (3) 
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 In equation (2), rd  is the observed binary endogenous variable equal to one if a 
given firm reports international R&D outsourcing, and zero for non-R&D reporters. The 
vector w  reflects factors that influence this decision. In equation (3), the variable r stands 
for international R&D outsourcing expenditures, and the vector z  represents its 
determinants. We denote the error terms as e  and  , and we assume that they are 
distributed as a normal bivariate with zero mean, variances 2 1   and 2 e , and correlation 
coefficient e .   
 Vectors w  and z  include, among others, the variables lack of finance and lack of 
information, and the indicators of the exporting activity. Notice that R&D outsourcing 
abroad can stimulate exports, given that outsourcing can allow access to a wider 
technological network and the accommodation of the firm’s products to the specificities 
of foreign markets. This can generate a potential endogeneity problem. In order to avoid 
this problem, we include the indicators of the exporting activity lagged one period. We 
also incorporate each of the lack of finance and lack of information variables multiplied 
by the being an exporter dummy variable (interacted variables) in the regression. We 
denote these variables as lack of finance: exporters, lack of finance: non-exporters, lack 
of information: exporters, and lack of information: non-exporters, respectively. 
 In the theoretical model, each firm has an ex ante efficiency   associated with the 
productivity of traditional inputs and R&D resources. Recall that we assume that firms 
with ex ante higher efficiency have also higher absorptive capacity. Therefore, we 
include in the regressions a group of variables that reflect internal capabilities such as 
economies of scale coming from specialization, and firms’ specific advantages. We 
include the variables: R&D employment, a binary variable for companies with continuous 
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R&D engagement, and firm size. Under the existence of economies of scale, we expect 
that firm size affects outsourcing positively. Additionally, we include two dummy 
variables that reflect that companies produce with intensive technological techniques: a 
variable denoting whether the firm is part of a multinational, and whether it has applied 
for patents.8 We also include two dummies reflecting whether the firm belongs to a high-
tech manufacturing industry, or to the high-tech services sector (to classify sectors, we 
follow the Eurostat/OECD classification, 2007). Finally, we include a set of geographical 
dummies.   
 In addition, if a firm’s ex ante efficiency is higher than a certain threshold F , the 
firm finds outsourcing abroad profitable. In the model, this threshold depends on the lack 
of finance, the lack of information, export activity, and relative gains in productivity 
between the different types of outsourcing (the parameter  ), among other factors. 
Following these considerations, we also include in our specification variables that could 
make foreign outsourcing more productive than domestic outsourcing. We consider that 
market focused companies can obtain more productivity gains if they outsource abroad 
than less market focused firms. Companies report the importance of institutional sources 
of information, internal sources of information, and market sources of information in 
order to innovate. These variables can measure how market-focused the companies are. 
We consider that companies that obtain information from universities, other public 
research centres or internal sources are less market-focused than companies that prefer 
market sources of information. Therefore, we expect that these two groups of firms 
                                                 
8 For example, Chang and Robin (2006) show that firm size is a key variable for explaining technology 
imports in Taiwanese firms. An important result in the literature refers to the fact that multinationals 
produce with intensive technological techniques (e.g., Girma and Görg, 2004). 
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obtain fewer gains from outsourcing than companies that obtain many innovations from 
the market.  
 We have estimated both equations with the same set of explanatory variables 
( z w ), with two exceptions: The export activity is included in the selection equation 
through the dummy variable being an exporter, while in the intensity equation it is 
introduced in terms of export intensity. The other exception is the continuous R&D 
engagement that we expect to be relevant for the outsourcing decision, but we assume 
that it has no effect on outsourcing intensity. The model predicts that the decision to 
outsource abroad instead of domestically depends on both costs differentials and the 
decision to maintain regular internal R&D activities (through being more productive). 
However, we consider that the intensity of outsourcing abroad mostly depends on costs 
differentials. The reason is that continuous R&D tends to affect the decision to engage in 
other international activities (Griffith et al., 2006). However, the intensive margins are 
more related to intensity variables than the extensive margins. For example, Chaney (2008) 
and Ruhl (2005) argue that when there are transitory shocks most of the firm’s adjustments 
happen at the intensive margin, whereas in response to permanent shocks the extensive 
margins adjust.   
 
3.4. The results 
 We turn to the analysis of international R&D outsourcing. We estimate equations 
(2) and (3) using a Generalized Tobit model without including the interacted variables. 9 
The first column of Table 3 exhibits the coefficients of the probit model for the decision to 
                                                 
9 The interacted variables are the variables lack of finance and lack of information multiplied by the 
dummy variable being an exporter. 
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outsource R&D internationally. The second one corresponds to the intensity, taking the 
selection term into account. The correlation term e  is statistically different from zero, 
pointing out the need to estimate a selection model for the observed intensity.   
INSERT TABLE 2 
Being an exporter increases the probability of outsourcing R&D abroad by 5 
percentage points. The estimated coefficients in column (2) show that export intensity yields 
a significant effect in the outsourcing expenditures. To place this result in perspective, the 
probability to outsource abroad of an average company with external R&D expenditures is 
9.4%, which implies that exporting increases the probability to outsource internationally by 
more than one half. This result is consistent with our Proposition 1, and our first empirical 
observation, supporting the hypothesis of complementarities between both types of 
internationalisation strategies. 
Our theory predicts that financial constraints and information are major determinants 
for international R&D outsourcing. The estimations show that lack of information reduces 
the probability of outsourcing by approximately 2 percentage points, but it has a negligible 
influence on the quantity outsourced abroad. By contrast, we find that the lack of finance has 
a negative impact on the quantity that is outsourced abroad, while having no influence on 
the outsourcing decision.  
 Conditional on reporting external R&D expenditures, most variables have the 
expected positive impact on the propensity to contract R&D abroad. Larger firms are more 
likely to outsource than smaller companies, although the relationship is non-linear. Firms 
that consider market sources of information as crucial are keener to outsource 
internationally. However, companies that find institutional sources of information 
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important give priority to domestic locations. This is what we would expect if they were 
less market-focused.  
 The previous estimations have the limitation that we cannot distinguish whether the 
impacts of financial constraints and information problems differ between exporters and 
non-exporters. We address this issue by including the interacted variables in the 
specification. The results of the estimations are reported in Table 3. We find strong 
confirmation for our Proposition 3. In columns (1) and (2), we show that for exporters a 
lack of information on technology or on markets decreases the probability of outsourcing 
R&D abroad by approximately 3 percentage points, while for non-exporters the impact of 
this variable is negligible.  
 We also find some support for Proposition 2. The lack of finance variable has a 
negative effect on the outsourcing expenditure only for non-exporters but it has no effect on 
the decision to outsource, either for exporters or for non-exporters. Plausibly, smaller firms 
tend to be more financially constrained than large companies.10 Therefore, firm size can be 
negatively correlated with lack of finance. This simultaneity can induce a bias in the 
estimated coefficient for non-exporters. To avoid this simultaneity problem, columns (3) 
and (4) present the regressions excluding the variable size in the estimations. The results are 
statistically significant: lack of finance affects the decision to outsource R&D abroad but 
only for non-exporters, as Proposition 2 states. Financial constraints lead to a decrease in 
international R&D outsourcing by non-exporters of almost 2 percentage points, and it has 
no effect on exporters. This finding suggests that exporters outsource abroad more than 
non-exporters due to lower financial constraints, in line with our Proposition 2, and not 
                                                 
10 For example Carpenter and Petersen (2002) show that the growth of most small firms is constrained by 
internal finance. 
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only because they have advantages in finding suppliers abroad. These results are consistent 
with our theoretical model and with the empirical observations.11   
INSERT TABLE 3 
4. Conclusions  
In this paper, we study the determinants of international R&D outsourcing by 
analysing the role of trade, financial constraints, and information. We develop a model of 
monopolistic competition with heterogeneous firms. The model shows that the 
probability of outsourcing R&D abroad is higher for exporters than for non-exporters. 
Furthermore, financial constraints decrease the probability of outsourcing internationally. 
This effect is more important for non-exporters than for exporters.  By contrast, exporters 
have major losses if there is technology leakage. It makes them more sensitive to 
obtaining information that helps to monitor their outsourced R&D.  
The empirical results are consistent with the predictions of the model. The 
probability to outsource abroad of an average company with external R&D expenditures 
is 9.4%. Being an exporter increases this probability by around 5.5 percentage points. 
Financial constraints reduce the probability of outsourcing abroad for non-exporters, by 2 
percentage points. For exporters, we find no relationship between outsourcing abroad and 
financial constraints. The lack of information on technology or on markets reduces the 
probability of outsourcing abroad only for exporters, by around 3 percentage points.   
International R&D outsourcing is becoming a rapidly growing source of 
technological flows that can decrease productivity differences across countries. The type 
                                                 
11 As a robustness test, we examine the determinants of R&D outsourcing only for exporters. The estimated 
coefficients are in line of those calculated in Table 3. For simplicity, these estimations are not reported. 
They are available in the working paper version of the article.  
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of public policies to promote international acquisitions of R&D, and therefore to enhance 
the country’s technological advantage, can differ depending on the internationalization of 
the firm. Stronger intellectual property rights can induce exporters to outsource R&D 
internationally because it can reduce the hold-up problem. However, innovative non-
exporters can require soft loans, grants, or investments from specialized financial 
organizations, which in turns should make them less financially constraint. An aspect that 
remains to be studied is the consequences of international R&D outsourcing for the 
domestic industry. Relative to public policy, we consider this to be an important issue to 
be analysed in future research. 
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Figure 1 
R&D outsourcing by exporting activity in 2005.  
(Percentage of firms in the sample of firms with external R&D expenditures) 
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Figure 2    
Lack of finance by exporting activity in 2005 
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Figure 3  
Lack of information by exporting activity in 2005 
(Mean value in the sample of firms with external R&D expenditures) 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Firms with R&D 
expenditure 
Firms with external 
R&D expenditure 
Firms with 
international 
outsourcing 
  Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
R&D expenditure at foreign locations (in log.) 0.53 2.35 1.28 3.52 10.56 2.08 
Exporter 0.57 0.49 0.63 0.48 0.74 0.44 
Exporter (t-1) 0.37 0.48 0.45 0.50 0.59 0.49 
Export intensity (in log.) 5.70 5.11 6.32 5.09 7.64 4.85 
Lack of finance 1.80 0.89 1.80 0.88 1.75 0.88 
Lack of information 1.27 0.78 1.30 0.77 1.18 0.73 
Proxies for market proximity       
  Internal sources of information 0.62 0.48 0.64 0.48 0.69 0.46 
  Institutional sources of information 0.18 0.38 0.26 0.44 0.26 0.44 
  Market sources of information 0.53 0.50 0.58 0.49 0.69 0.46 
Absorptive capacity       
  Continuous R&D engagement 0.69 0.46 0.70 0.46 0.84 0.37 
  R&D employment (% over total employment) 23.14 28.41 24.64 30.14 27.10 30.57 
  Multinational: subsidiary 0.13 0.34 0.16 0.37 0.22 0.41 
  Multinational: parent company 0.07 0.25 0.09 0.29 0.11 0.31 
  Patent 0.17 0.38 0.22 0.41 0.33 0.47 
  Technological cooperation 0.39 0.49 0.55 0.50 0.59 0.49 
  Size (number of employees) 241.8 1554.8 336.7 2050.8 353.1 930.8 
  Geographical regions       
    Basque country 0.13 0.34 0.14 0.35 0.12 0.33 
    Catalonia 0.26 0.44 0.22 0.42 0.32 0.46 
    Madrid 0.14 0.35 0.13 0.33 0.17 0.38 
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 Table 2 
Determinants of international R&D outsourcing 
Generalized Tobit model 
 
 All firms 
(1) 
Locating R&D abroad 
(2) 
Foreign R&D expenditure
 Coefficient Std. E. Coefficient Std. E. 
Exporter (t-1) 0.302 *** 0.068    
Export intensity (t-1)    0.060 ** 0.026 
Lack of finance -0.002   0.040 -0.259 ** 0.127 
Lack of information -0.127 *** 0.044 -0.266   0.167 
Proxies for market proximity     
  Internal sources of information 0.031   0.068 -0.252   0.218 
  Institutional sources of information -0.163 ** 0.072 0.096   0.287 
  Market sources of information 0.241 *** 0.067 0.632 ** 0.248 
Absorptive capacity     
  Continuous R&D engagement 0.146   0.089    
  R&D employment 0.350 *** 0.111 0.928   0.894 
  Multinational: subsidiary  0.212 *** 0.080 0.725 ** 0.289 
  Patent 0.235 *** 0.070 0.640 ** 0.290 
  Size 0.0003 *** 0.9E-04 0.001 *** 0.0004 
  Size squared  -3.0E-08 ** 1.2E-08 -1.2E-07   7.4E-08 
  High and mid-tech manufacturing 0.164 ** 0.070 0.850 *** 0.253 
  High-tech services 0.166   0.102 0.502   0.408 
Selection term   0.677 ** 0.179 
 dy/dx  Std. E. dy/dx  Std. E. 
Exporter (t-1) 0.054 *** 0.013    
Export intensity (t-1)    0.060 ** 0.026 
Lack of finance 0.000   0.007 -0.256 ** 0.117 
Lack of information -0.022 *** 0.008 -0.095   0.137 
Proxies for market proximity     
  Internal sources of information 0.005   0.012 -0.294   0.198 
  Institutional sources of information -0.027 ** 0.011 0.314   0.241 
  Market sources of information 0.041 *** 0.011 0.309   0.218 
Absorptive capacity     
  Continuous R&D engagement 0.024 * 0.014    
  R&D employment 0.061 *** 0.019 0.459   0.837 
  Multinational: subsidiary  0.040 ** 0.017 0.444 * 0.235 
  Patent 0.044 *** 0.014 0.327   0.242 
Log likelihood:  -1,734.11 
Number of observations 2,759 359 
 
Note: Std. E.: Estimated standard error. All regressions include the constant and dummies for geographical 
regions. Apart from coefficients, marginal effects (dy/dx) are reported at sample means for the probability 
of locating R&D abroad and for the expected value of R&D expenditures at foreign locations (in log.) 
conditional on locating R&D abroad. * Significant at 10%. ** significant at 5%. *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 3  
Determinants of international R&D outsourcing. Generalized Tobit model   
 (1) 
Locating R&D abroad
(2) 
Foreign R&D expenditure
(3) 
Locating R&D abroad
(4) 
Foreign R&D expenditure 
 Coefficient Std. E. Coefficient Std. E. Coefficient Std. E. Coefficient Std. E. 
Exporter (t-1) 0.257 *** 0.076  0.295 *** 0.075
Export intensity (t-1) 0.049 * 0.029 0.075 ** 0.029 
Lack of finance: exporters 0.039 0.045 -0.151 0.138 0.031 0.045 -0.156 0.149 
Lack of finance: non-exporters -0.089 0.059 -0.537 ** 0.248 -0.096 * 0.058 -0.610 ** 0.256 
Lack of information: exporters -0.159 *** 0.053 -0.345 ** 0.172 -0.165 *** 0.052 -0.459 ** 0.183 
Lack of information: non-exporters -0.060 0.072 -0.037 0.336 -0.057 0.071 -0.048 0.340 
Proxies for market proximity  
  Internal sources of information 0.034 0.068 -0.224 0.213 0.042 0.067 -0.148 0.232 
  Institutional sources of information -0.164 ** 0.072 0.074 0.278 -0.158 ** 0.072 0.107 0.275 
  Market sources of information 0.232 *** 0.067 0.596 ** 0.248 0.240 *** 0.067 0.775 *** 0.264 
Absorptive capacity  
  Continuous R&D engagement 0.149 0.091  0.138 0.088
  R&D employment 0.375 *** 0.113 1.007 0.864 0.293 *** 0.110 0.451 0.788 
  Multinational: subsidiary  0.213 *** 0.080 0.748 ** 0.295 0.227 *** 0.080 0.883 *** 0.306 
  Patent 0.238 *** 0.071 0.654 ** 0.288 0.262 *** 0.070 0.816 *** 0.298 
  Size 2.9E-04 *** 8.5E-05 0.001 *** 0.0004
  Size squared  -3.0E-08 *** 1.2E-08 -1.2E-07 * 7.4E-08
  High and mid-tech manufacturing 0.159 ** 0.070 0.846 *** 0.248 0.153 ** 0.070 0.835 *** 0.260 
  High-tech services 0.177 * 0.104 0.517 0.411 0.176 * 0.102 0.661 0.415 
Selection term 0.677 ** 0.176 0.767 *** 0.116 
 dy/dx Std. E. dy/dx Std. E. dy/dx Std. E. dy/dx Std. E. 
Exporter (t-1) 0.045 *** 0.014  0.058 *** 0.015
Export intensity (t-1) 0.049 * 0.029 0.075 ** 0.029 
Lack of finance: exporters 0.007 0.008 -0.204 0.127 0.006 0.009 -0.209 0.133 
Lack of finance: non-exporters -0.015 0.010 -0.418 * 0.245 -0.019 * 0.011 -0.448 * 0.245 
Lack of information: exporters -0.027 *** 0.009 -0.132 0.138 -0.032 *** 0.010 -0.180 0.143 
Lack of information: non-exporters -0.010 0.012 0.043 0.320 -0.011 0.014 0.048 0.321 
Proxies for market proximity  
  Internal sources of information 0.006 0.011 -0.269 0.194 0.008 0.013 -0.219 0.203 
  Institutional sources of information -0.027 ** 0.011 0.295 0.235 -0.029 ** 0.013 0.375 0.231 
  Market sources of information 0.039 *** 0.011 0.284 0.212 0.045 *** 0.012 0.369 * 0.218 
Absorptive capacity  
  Continuous R&D engagement 0.024 * 0.014  0.025 * 0.015
  R&D employment 0.065 *** 0.019 0.504 0.813 0.057 *** 0.021 -0.044 0.763 
  Multinational: subsidiary  0.040 ** 0.017 0.464 * 0.246 0.048 *** 0.018 0.504 ** 0.248 
  Patent 0.044 *** 0.014 0.338 0.239 0.055 *** 0.016 0.378 0.243 
Log likelihood -1,731.38 -1,746.40Number of observations 2,759 359 2,759 359
See notes from Table 2. 
 
